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Voting Experience and Perceived Media Impact 
Second- and Third-Person-Effects of Political Communication in Germany 
 
- ABSTRACT - 
 
The notion that people believe others to be more susceptible for media impact than themselves has 
attracted substantial scholarly interest in recent years. The present paper reports on the first field 
study of the third-person effect in Germany. On occasion of the Federal election campaign in 2002, 
a survey determined respondent’s belief of how strongly the general public, their friends and family, 
and their own person was affected by six different sorts of communication sources. Results confirm 
the perceptual component of the third-person concept (including the social distance and the message 
desirability hypothesis) but fail to prove effects on the behavioural intention of voters. The 
magnitude of perceptual gaps is influenced by a person’s voting experience, with first-time voters 
displaying smaller differences in impact assessments. But the part of media use and political 
involvement in this process of political communication is still unclear and requires further research. 
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First-time Voters and Perceived Media Impact 
Second- and Third-Person-Effects of Political Communication in Germany 
 
Among the implications of mass communication for society, the notion of a third-person effect 
(TPE) on people’s perceptions of how susceptible others are for media impact has attracted 
substantial scholarly interest in recent years. Since Davison (1983) introduced the idea that people 
perceive others to be affected more and more easily by messages than they are themselves, this 
relationship has proven to be robust, although its magnitude varies (for a meta-analysis see Paul, 
Salwen & Dupagne, 2000). Earlier research has ruled out that the differences found in people’s 
estimations are a mere methodological artefact evoked by the research instrument itself (Price & 
Tewksbury, 1996). Among the reasons given for this perceptual gap, psychological processes such 
as the ‘self-serving bias’ from attribution theory (Rucinski & Salmon, 1990), ‘unrealistic optimism’ 
and ‘impersonal impact’ were both supported empirically and seem to interact when people make 
judgments about media impact (Brosius & Engel, 1996). Beyond this perceptual component, a 
smaller number of studies have investigated the behavioural component of TPE, expressed in 
people’s willingness to support action (usually authorities’ restrictions in order to protect ‘others’) 
which is supposed to increase with the magnitude of their perceptual differential. Most early studies 
concentrated on support of censorship (for an overview see also Lee & Tamborini, 2005), but the 
evidence of a link between perceptions and other (intended) behaviour is mixed at least (Jensen & 
Hurley, 2005 for further references). 
While most of the empirical research on TPE was conducted in the U.S. so far, the present 
study is the second to analyze people’s perceptions of media effects in Germany, following the 
experimental study of Brosius & Engel (1996) carried out more than ten years ago. Scholars have 
already argued that cultural factors might influence the nature and magnitude of TPE (Lee & 
Tamborini, 2005: 295-297). Although the U.S. and Germany both can be described as highly 
industrialized and relatively wealthy Western democracies, substantial differences in the German 
media system compared to the U.S. (see e.g. Humphreys, 1994) raise the question whether the 
convincing results obtained for the American audience can easily be generalized to another cultural 
background. The same is true for the varying nature of the political system, as the present study 
focuses particularly on the perception of media effects on political opinion building. While the 
Second- and Third-Person-Effects of Political Communication in Germany - 4 - 
 
phenomenon has been documented across many types of media content (e. g. pornography, hate 
speech, rap lyrics, news, and advertising; see Lambe & McLeod, 2005 for further references), the 
field of political communication is, apart from a few studies on negative campaign advertising, 
rarely investigated in TPE research (for exceptions see Rucinski & Salmon, 1990; Meirick, 2004). 
From the broad range of factors influencing the TPE which were identified in studies so far, we 
emphasize the relevance of message desirability and the social distance of the comparison group. 
Our main research question asks whether the influence of the TPE differs between first-time voters 
and experienced voters during a campaign, thus exerting an influence on individual attitudes and 
opinions towards politics. 
 
Differences in Perceived Media Impact and Voting: a Research Model 
The notion of „the ‚other’ as the vulnerable voter” (Rucinski & Salmon, 1990) gains popularity 
especially in times of political campaigns. Politicians, but experts and journalists themselves, too, 
assume that media coverage plays a crucial role for political opinion building in general and during 
elections in particular (see e.g. McLeod et al., 2002). TV debates of candidates may serve to 
illustrate the sensitivity of this issue: To prevent an expected manipulation of viewers perceived as 
highly susceptible to debate messages, the debates televised in Germany were regulated by a long 
list of rules and arrangements between the opponents, allowing for limited individualism in 
presentation only. Nevertheless, both observers of the 2002 and 2005 debates and pollsters attributed 
a high impact to the media events that were broadcast simultaneously by all main networks and 
attracted more than 20 million in front of German TV sets (Holtz-Bacha et al., 2005; Der Spiegel, 
2005).  
Altogether, TPE are likely to occur in the field of politics for several reasons: First, most of 
the political process is communicated by media, and for a majority of the population media coverage 
remains the only (or at least the most important) source for political information. Second, especially 
during campaigns political issues climb on top of the public agenda, thus indicating the relevance of 
the issue and putting people under pressure to form an opinion. Third, politics should represent a 
realm relevant for processes of social comparison, given the ideal of an informed citizen. And 
finally, with respect to the behavioural component of TPE, voting is a civil duty guided by moral 
and legal imperatives: Elections should be free, secret, and give equal opportunities to all voters, and 
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one may expect a considerable readiness to protect the greatest good in Western democracies against 
manipulation by mass media. 
If applied to political media content, the TPE concept suggests that some of the factors 
identified by earlier research to influence the effect could be particularly significant (Rucinski & 
Salmon, 1990; see recently Jensen & Hurley, 2005 in the case of environmental issues): 
Social distance of the comparison group has proven to be a decisive moderator of TPE 
perceptions throughout all empirical studies (see Paul, Salwen & Dupaigne, 2000). Defining social 
distance as the degree of similarity between self and others, the perceptual difference increases as 
others become more socially distant from self (e.g. Eveland et al., 1999; Cohen et al., 1988). 
Although comparison groups have occasionally been varied in terms of demographic characteristics 
(age, race etc.), in most cases social distance is operationalized by the generality of the group, from 
close acquaintances to the broad public opinion at large. Much of the empirical validity attributed to 
the perceptual hypothesis is based on the fact that studies continuously reproduced the linear 
increase of difference values with increasing social distance (Perloff, 2002). 
Desirability of the media content is another relevant contextual variable that influences the 
occurrence of TPE: Implicitly, empirical studies tend to rely on undesirable messages (like 
pornography or advertising) for examining perceptual differences. This refers to the psychological 
processes mentioned above which are more likely to occur when the assumed media impact is 
supposed to be negative, and the same notion justifies the call for censorship etc. in the behavioural 
component of TPE. In contrast, the requirement to include impact assertions of desirable media 
content to test the perceptual hypothesis was emphasized rarely (Paul et al., 2000). Again, empirical 
evidence is mixed – some studies in fact found that respondents attributed a greater effect on others 
for undesirable messages (cigarette ads) and a greater effect on themselves for desirable messages 
(antismoking PSAs; Henriksen & Flora, 1999). Following the notion that perceptions of desirability 
may rather be a function of people’s individual attitudes towards the message than a general 
characteristic of a message (Salwen & Dupagne, 1999: 524), recent studies suggested a positive 
correlation between desirability and effects on self (Jensen & Hurley, 2005) while others failed to do 
so (Lambe & McLeod, 2005 with degree of antisocialness as an indicator for desirability). 
Other moderating factors can be identified from earlier TPE research and the nature of the 
present topic (political media content). Older persons have demonstrated a larger discrepancy 
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between perceived media impact on self and others (Brosius & Engel, 1996: 143). On the other 
hand, “higher levels of education correspond to higher levels of the third-person effect […] Thus, 
education may enhance feelings of superiority rather than fostering greater accuracy” (Rucinski & 
Salmon, 1990: 363). Media use patterns, particularly frequency of exposure, have also qualified 
sometimes as relevant predictors of perceptual differences (Lambe & McLeod, 2005; Price et al., 
1997; Rucinski & Salmon, 1990). But as reviews in general neglect a direct influence of traditional 
media use on the perceptual gap (Lee & Tambourini, 2005: 297), additional aspects beyond the mere 
amount of usage should be considered. Finally, in his study on TPE of political advertising, Meirick 
(2004) suggested that political predispositions may guide respondents’ perceptions of candidates. 
To analyze both the perceptual and behavioural component of TPE in the field of political 
communication in Germany, we developed a research model which integrates the main constructs 
outlined above (see Fig. 1). The core of the model is established by the basic indicator of the 
perceptual hypothesis – the assessment of media influence on oneself (first person; ‘I’), on people in 
one’s closer environment (second person; ‘you’), and on the general public (third person; ‘they’). 
This terminology follows the original notion by Davison (1983: 3) which expresses social distance 
in terms of generality. As a consequence, the difference between the individual assessment and the 
second person assessment constitutes a respondent’s second person perception1
 
 (in relation to self), 
and respectively the difference between the individual assessment and the third person assessment 
constitutes a respondent’s third person perception (in relation to self). 
[about here: Fig. 1] 
 
Taking content desirability variations into account, both types of perception may vary in the 
field of political communication if respondents are advised to estimate the effects of different types 
of media content. We identified six different sources of political information based on earlier 
research and our observation of the campaign on occasion of the German Federal elections in 2002. 
Rather than collecting individual ratings of desirability, we grouped the sources as exerting a 
desirable impact, ambivalent and an undesirable impact according to their credibility and intention 
                                                 
1 Please note that this terminology follows the grammar use of ‘second person’; see Jensen & Hurley (2005: 252) for a 
similar application. Other authors (e. g. Neuwirth & Frederick 2002) used the term ‘second-person effect’ differently. 
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to persuade as suggested by Brosius and Engel (1996: 143). Thus, we classified political news or 
features and interviews with politicians as content desirable for opinion building, while political 
advertising represented an undesirable message (p. 153). The same is true for the publication of 
polling results which were judged as almost as harmful to the electoral process as negative political 
ads in earlier research (Rucinski & Salmon, 1990: 355 & Table 1). This study ranked the TV debates 
of the candidates as less harmful, but recent research on debate perception in Germany proved some 
suspicion of voters towards this format of conveying politics (Holtz-Bacha et al., 2005). So we 
decided to put German TV debates in the ambivalent media type group, as well as the individual’s 
debates with friends; in this case, no evidence of their desirability was available which is no surprise 
as desirability will vary with the single discussion and the persons actually involved. 
These overall 12 perception differentials (six types of content by two social distance 
measures) can, following the original TPE concept, be assumed to influence respondent’s behaviour. 
Or to be more precisely: respondent’s behavioural intentions, as all empirical studies on TPE 
(including the present one) do not measure overt behaviour but ask people whether they would exert 
carry out a certain action if asked to (e. g. signing a petition for censorship; Gunther, 1995). 
Accordingly, in the field of politics the possible behavioural intentions caused by the perceptual 
gaps might include the support of voting restrictions for certain groups (as a pendant to censorship 
support). On the other hand, no evidence exists whether perceptual differences might account for 
actions related to the own behaviour rather than a more general call for administrative action. 
Possible constructs in this respect include the efforts a person makes for his or her individual voting 
decision, and one’s political efficacy (in contrast to the concept of Internet self-efficacy introduced 
by Lee & Tambourini, 2005). The concepts of ‘impersonal impact’ and ‘self-serving bias’ (see 
above) would suggest that people with distinct perceptual gaps are also more willing to prospect 
individual action in order to maintain their positive self-image. 
In the case of political content, the media impact perception differentials themselves may be 
influenced by several constructs: Among the moderating factors, media use of the respondent 
yielded a limited explanatory power in the past, why we suggest to include measures of media image 
and perceived media bias in our model. First, the ‘generalized attitude’ (Brosius & Engel, 1996: 
148-149) that German media report in a credible and objective way on politics may trigger 
theoretical processes addressed by the ‘unrealistic optimism’ explanation of the TPE (Gunther & 
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Mundy, 1993; see above). If there is a tendency of individuals to hold a more favourite opinion of 
themselves and to attribute negative circumstances preferably to others, a negative image of mass 
media coverage should increase the perceptual gap as they should believe that they are too smart for 
being influenced by ‘bad’ media. Strictly speaking, this variable represents a generalized but 
individual-level variation on the desirability distinctions with regard to the different types of media 
content. Accordingly, a media bias perceived in comparison to one’s own political position might 
cause the same mechanism. 
With regard to media impact on political attitudes of people, one might argue that their 
political involvement should determine at least partly their assumptions on self and other’s 
vulnerability. If their cognitive schemata regarding current events are more developed, they can 
assume that they are more resistant against media influence. Indicators for a fostered perspective on 
politics are – beyond an explicit party affiliation – their degrees of political knowledge and interest. 
Particularly in a campaign situation, this assumption can be put down to a voter’s familiarity with 
the setting: We expect that first-time voters have had little opportunity yet to develop any feeling of 
superiority, while experienced voters, reinforced by the factor age (see above), should report a larger 
gap in assumed media effect on self and others. 
Another personal characteristic that might account for TPE is education as pointed out earlier. 
Additionally, the general worldview of a person should as well be related to his or her reflection of 
‘unrealistic optimism. Being related to (but not identical with) education, the personality strength of 
an individual, indicating general opinion leadership, has proven to be a relevant trait in explaining 
media effects (e. g. Schenk & Roessler, 1997) and thus can as well play a role for media effects 
perception. 
This model implies several hypothesis on the occurrence of TPE in the field of political 
communication, and furthermore it addresses additional research question where earlier research 
does not suggest a specific relationship between the constructs. We specified some of these for an 
empirical test on occasion of the German Federal elections in 2002. First of all, before analyzing the 
TPE process in detail, the basic perceptual hypothesis of TPE needs to be confirmed for the German 
public. 
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H1: People expect a higher impact of political media coverage on others than on themselves 
(perceptual gap). 
 
Earlier research suggests that this perceptual gap will vary with the social distance of the 
comparison group and with the desirability of the media content, while the interaction patterns of 
both variables are unclear. 
 
H2: The perceptual gap increases with an increasing distance between self and the 
comparison group; it will be larger for third-person perceptions of an impact on a 
general public and smaller for second-perceptions referring to friends and acquaintances. 
H3: The perceptual gap increases with a decreasing desirability of a media effect; it will be 
highest for media content where an effect is undesirable, smaller for ambivalent types of 
media content, and negligible or even reversed when a media impact is desirable. 
RQ1: Is there an interaction between the influence of social distance and message desirability? 
 
A second step in TPE research addresses the behavioural intentions related with the perceptual 
gap. While support for restrictive measures was prevalent in some of the earlier empirical research, 
we suggest an analogy to individual behavioural intentions. 
 
H4: With an increasing perceptual gap, a person’s willingness to support voting restrictions 
for certain groups of voters increases. 
H5: With an increasing perceptual gap, a person’s own efforts for political decision-making 
increase. 
H6: With an increasing perceptual gap, a person’s feeling of political efficacy increases. 
 
In the case of campaigns and ballots, people’s age becomes relevant as it corresponds with 
their previous experiences in the process of voting. Accordingly, earlier TPE research suggests that 
the perceptual differences would be larger for older persons; young voters who are called to the 
ballots for the first time may have less experience with the outcome of elections and the role of 
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media in this process. This could find expression in a more homogenous view of the audience with 
regard to media effects. 
 
H7: First-time voters and experienced voters differ in the magnitude of TPE; perceptual gaps 
should be larger and resulting behavioural intentions more conclusive for experienced 
voters. 
 
Finally, the role of media use and evaluation, political involvement other personal traits is 
open for discussion, leading to a second research question: 
 
RQ2: How do media use patterns, general media image, indicators for political involvement, 
and general personal traits influence the magnitude of perceptual differences concerning 
media impact? 
 
These seven hypothesis and two research questions will be elaborated on considering possible 
cultural differences evoked by distinctions between the U.S. and Germany with respect to their 
media and political system.  
 
Method and Proceedings 
Before the model suggested above could be tested with a survey among German voters, a 
preliminary step was necessary to rule out a simple learning effect from the mass media causing 
TPE perceptions: There exists a remote possibility that media coverage itself consists of exhaustive 
reports on the effects of mass media in the political sphere. In this case, a content analysis of 
coverage is required, in order to determine whether reports have indicated a substantial media 
impact on large parts of the audience. If so, perceptual differences might not be the result of 
psychological processes of social comparison but a mere learning from the media. Although this 
option is usually neglected by TPE studies based on the implicit assumption that no factual source 
for people’s assertions of media effects exists, we decided to monitor political coverage previous to 
our survey. During the eight weeks preceding the fieldwork, we collected eight leading German 
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newspapers and political magazines2 and taped the 27 hours of TV news and political features3
The results of this monitoring procedure, which cannot be presented in detail here, justify the 
notion that TPE may occur: Despite the trend of self-reference within the media system, coverage 
contained almost no assertions of possible media effects during the campaign, except from 
assumptions about debate impact on viewers. Altogether, we found not more than 27 reports (and 
only one on TV) which explicitly specified media effects on the political decision-making of the 
audience. Based on these facts, simple learning effects based on media coverage about media impact 
may be ruled out. 
 on 
German networks. 
Consequently, a survey was carried out among German voters between September 23 and 
September 29, 2002 which was the one-week period immediately after the election Sunday. 
Although a main purpose of the study was to determine the informational and voting behaviour of 
Germans who did not stay in Germany during the final phase of the campaign (see Roessler, 2003), 
the study also collected data on the third-person perceptions and of several types of media content. 
Overall, 423 face-to-face interviews with German voters were conducted by 40 students of media 
and communications in several vacation spots on the coast of Northern Spain along the 
Mediterranean Sea. Respondents were recruited in public spaces (on the beach, in restaurants and 
cafeterias or on the beach promenade), thus constituting a convenience sample with the results not 
claiming to be representative for the German electorate. Nevertheless, students were required to 
contact at least ten respondents following a quota plan which overrepresented the group of first-time 
voters. 
A sample description is provided in the appendix and reveals that 39.5 percent of participants 
(n = 167) qualified as first-time voters in the Federal elections aged 21 and younger. Another 253 
interviewees were classified as experienced voters older than 21. Compared to the German 
population, the share of male respondents is slightly higher, particularly among the experienced 
voters. In this group, educational levels are distributed rather equally, while first-time voters are 
                                                 
2 The selection included Süddeutsche Zeitung, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Frankfurter Rundschau, Die 
Tageszeitung (quality press), BILD (tabloid press), Der Spiegel, Focus, Die Zeit (weeklies). 
3 We monitored the nationwide networks ARD, ZDF, RTL, SAT1 and VOX. 
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better educated than average in this group.4 The share of respondents from former East Germany is 
similar in both parts of the sample and corresponds with their actual share in the population. Almost 
every interviewee claimed that he or she had participated in the elections by absentee ballot which 
has grown to be a rather familiar behaviour in Germany during the recent years. But compared to the 
actual voter turnout of 79,1 percent, we argue that social desirability has biased the respondents’ 
answers in this respect. The political position of our interviewees, recorded on a scale between 0 and 
100, was 45 in average (SD = 18) and approached the centre of the scale, expressing the German 
voter’s orientation towards a political mainstream. Nevertheless, a majority of respondents 
supported the ruling chancellor Gerhard Schröder, leading candidate of the Social Democrats and 
latter winner of the election. Three out of four interviewees were willing to reveal their vote, and 
accordingly first time voters tended to support the ruling coalition of social democrats and the Green 
party. This corresponds with official statistics where these parties as well gathered a larger share in 
the group of voters between 18 and 25 years (Hahlen, 2003). However, the conservative CDU/CSU 
does not reach its actual share in our sample of experienced voters while the social democrats are 
somewhat overrepresented. Altogether, the present sample differs in some respects from the general 
German electorate but portrays the groups of first-time and experienced voters rather accurately with 
only minor exceptions. As the reported differences to population statistics are, in our view, not 
substantial and TPE survey studies on a similar data grounds often provided relevant insight 
(recently e. g. Lambe & McLeod, 2005; Lee & Tamborini, 2005) we maintain that the present 
quota-based convenience sample is suited to test our hypothesis (and especially H7).5
In average, each interview took appr. 30 minutes and contained questions on respondent’s 
media use, their political attitudes and behaviour, the second- and third-person perceptions and some 
personal characteristics. The constructs specified in our research model (see Figure 1) were 
operationalized as follows: 
 
Perceptual variables. The assessment of media influenced followed the traditional proceeding 
in earlier TPE studies. Respondents were first asked to estimate the influence of each of six types of 
                                                 
4 This fact can be traced back to the scheduling of the elections which was not during regular vacation times. As a 
consequence, younger Germans encountered in holiday ressorts were predominantly students during their fall break. For 
similar reasons, families with school children are underrepresented within our sample. Both sample limitations should be 
kept in mind when interpreting the results of our study. 
5 Nevertheless, we point out that in a strict statistical sense the significance coefficients given in the following do not 
express the generalizability of results to a larger population of German voters but serve as mere indicators of relevance. 
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mass media content (political news and features; interviews with politicians, debates with friends, 
TV debates of candidates, polling results, political advertising) on their voting decision, based on a 
scale between 0 (no influence at all) and 100 (very strong influence).6
Behavioural intentions. The call for collective action dimension of the behavioural component 
was represented by a question on people’s support for a change of German Federal law that should 
make the right to vote dependent on a minimum level of political knowledge and interest.
 As earlier research could not 
prove any effects of different types of question wording (Brosius & Engel, 1996), we opted for a 
phrase with the individual as the object of media impact. In a subsequent part of the questionnaire, 
the same estimation was collected for the general population and in turn for one’s own friends and 
family (see Brosius & Engel, 1996 for similar operationalizations of social distance). The order of 
sources was randomized to prevent sequence effects, while the order of perceptual questions was 
held constant as previous research has shown that the perceptual hypothesis of TPE is not influenced 
by the placement of self-other questions (Dupagne et al., 1999). The six second-person perception 
differentials and the six third-person perception differentials were calculated by subtracting the 
impact value on self from the respective value for te comparison group. Thus, positive differential 
values indicate a perceptual bias as proposed by the second- and third-person metaphor. Negative 
values then indicate reversed TPE (Perloff, 1993: 170) or, in other terms, a first-person effect on 
self. 
7 The 
individual action dimension consisted of two constructs: First, to assess their made efforts for 
decision-making respondents were asked whether they had participated in a set of eight political 
activities8
                                                 
6 Question wording (translated from German): “Please consider your relationship to mass media now. According to your 
opinion, how much was your political attitude and voting decision affected by the following sources? Please rate on a 
scale between 0 (no impact at all) and 100 (very strong impact).” Sources rated: (1) political news and features; (2) 
interviews with politicians, (3) debates with friends, (4) TV debates of candidates, (5) polling results, (6) political 
advertising. 
 which were then condensed by an additive index (ranging from 0 to 8). Second, an index 
7 Question wording (translated from German): “Currently a suggestion is discussed to change electoral law in Germany. 
Only those persons should be allowed to vote who prove a certain minimum of political knowledge and interest. What 
do you think of this idea?” Answer items: (1) totally agree, (2) agree on principle, (3) don’t care, (4) rather disagree, (5) 
disagree completely. 
8 Options: (1) distributing material for a party, (2) tried to convince friends and family to go to the ballots, (3) advocated 
one’s political opinion in public, (4) read party programmes, (5) read party brochures and flyers (6) attended campaign 
conventions, (7) tried to convince friends and family of my political opinion, (8) read homepages of politicians and 
parties on the Internet. 
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of political efficacy was compiled from the answers on four individual assertions regarding the own 
influence on the political process (ranging from 4 to 20).9
Media-related variables. For newspapers and weekly magazines, news and features on TV and 
radio, and the Internet respectively a self-estimation was recorded how often respondents use those 
sources to obtain political information.
 
10 The generalized attitude towards media was determined by 
the answers on six items referring to objectivity and credibility of media coverage summarized by an 
additive index (ranging from 6 to 30).11 A perceived media bias was revealed by collecting an 
assertion of media’s political position in general which was then subtracted from the value for one’s 
own political position on the same scale.12
Political involvement. In contrast to political action related to the campaign (see above: 
behavioural intentions), we operationalized political involvement by three constructs: First, party 
affiliation consisted of respondent’s agreement to five statements referring to the individual 
relevance of the preferred party (index value ranging from 0 to 16).
 The magnitude of this difference (regardless of its 
direction) expresses the degree of how much the interviewee perceives the media to report 
differently from his or her own political perspective. 
13 As mere party membership is 
not very common in Germany and only a superficial indicator, affiliation was hence expressed by an 
additive index (ranging from 5 to 25). Second, political knowledge consisted of a self-assessment on 
five dimensions, covering factual knowledge and knowledge compared to others;14
                                                 
9 Statement wording (translated from German): (1) “No matter if I go to the ballots or not, this has no influence on what 
politicians are doing.” (2) “During campaigns, politicians promise a lot they do not remember any more after the 
elections.” (3) “The electorate was able to make a well-thought-out decision for these elections.” (4) “As voters we have 
proven with these elections that we can take responsibility for the future of our country.” Answers on a five-point scale 
(1 = agree; 5 = disagree), additive index with reversed scale for items (3) and (4). 
 again, we 
10 Scale between 0 (never) and 4 (daily, almost daily). 
11 Statement wording (translated from German): (1) “The media draw an authentic picture of political life in Germany.” 
(2) “Media depict political processes comprehensively and truthfully.” (3) “Political coverage in Germany is generally 
balanced, giving voice to different opinions and perspectives.” (4) “Media usually ursue their own political interests.” 
(5) “Important media have intentionally reported with a bias during the campaign.” (6) “One should be sceptical towards 
media and always question their coverage.” Statements rotated randomly, answers on a five-point scale (1 = agree; 5 = 
disagree), additive index with reversed scale for items (1) to (3). 
12 Question wording (translated from German): “In politics, we often differentiate between more left-wing and more 
right-wing positions. Please rate the position of German media in general referring to this range from left to right. Where 
would you locate the majority of German media outlets on a scale between 0 (left) and 100 (right)?” 
13 Statement dimensions: (1) Individual relevance of the preferred party, (2) orientation function of the party, (3) 
agreement with positions of the party, (4) voting for the party in recent elections. Statements rotated randomly, answers 
on a five-point scale (0 = none; 4 = high). 
14 Statement wording (translated from German): (1) “I am not very familiar with the political system of Germany.” (2) “I 
know the names of leading politicians in Germany.” (3) “Usually, I am well-informed about current political events.” (4) 
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formed an additive index of these answers (ranging from 5 to 25). Third, political interest was 
measured with a single question asking for the respondent’s interest in the recent campaign (scale 
between 0 = no interest at all and 10 = very strong interest). 
Personal characteristics. The distinction between first-time voters and experienced voters was 
made on the basis of respondent’s age, as election law in Germany allows voting for anyone aged 18 
and higher. Consequently, anyone aged 21 and less had no opportunity so far to participate in a 
Federal election and was thus labelled as a novice. The education scale consisted of the usual items 
for the German school system (as translated to American standards in the Appendix). The 
personality strength scale was applied according to its original formulation by Noelle-Neumann 
(1985; for the English translation see Weimann, 1994: 256). A set of thirteen personality traits15
 
 was 
integrated into an index value with every item weighted by a validated procedure (ranging from 101 
to 198). 
Results 
A prerequisite for any further analysis on the TPE is the existence of the basic perceptual gap 
between self and others. As predicted by H1, all twelve differential values are positive, indicating 
that respondents predominantly attribute higher media effects on others than on self (see Table 1). 
As many other studies before, our data support once more the general notion underlying the TPE. 
The same is true for the social distance assumption (H2): For all six types of media content, the 
perceptual gap is larger for third-person perceptions than for second-person perceptions, and the 
differences are highly significant in all cases. Respondents believe that the general public is more 
susceptible to media effects, compared to their friends and family members. 
 
[about here: Table 1] 
                                                                                                                                                                   
“I think that I am better informed about politics than most of my friends and family members.” (5) “I think that I am 
better informed about politics than most people in Germany.” Statements rotated randomly, answers on a five-point 
scale (1 = agree; 5 = disagree), additive index with reversed scale for items (2) to (5). 
15 Agreement with the following statements: (1) I usually count on being successful in everything I do. (2) I am rarely 
unsure about how I should behave. (3) I like to assume responsibility. (4) I like to take the lead when a group does things 
together. (5) I enjoy convincing others of my opinions. (6) I often notice that I serve as a model for others. (7) I am good 
at getting what I want. (8) I am often a step ahead of others. (9) I own many things others envy me for. (10) I often give 
others advice and suggestions. (11) Holder of a leading position in a profession/being a superior. (12) Participation in 
political party/trade union citizen's action group in leisure time. (13) Office held in a club or organization. 
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Evidence is more complicated with the desirability of messages expectation (H3). The two 
types of political media content defined as desirable (political news and features, interviews with 
politicians) indeed display the smallest gaps among all differentials, and the values for potentially 
undesirable impact sources (political advertising, polling results) are substantially higher. These 
results confirm our assumptions based on earlier research. But the two message types classified as 
ambivalent are not positioned between desirable and undesirable sources; instead, each of them joins 
the two extremes: Debates with friends and family members evoke only small differences between 
the impact perceived on others and on self, making it an almost desirable kind of influence. But 
much to our surprise, TV debates of candidates are, despite their strictly regulated staging, seen as 
highly influential on others. The differential values even exceed those of political advertising. As 
negative campaigning is not very popular in Germany so far, televised debates of the leading 
candidates seemingly represent the type of political communication which is attributed a high 
potential for manipulating the electorate. 
 
[about here: Figure 2] 
 
The interactions between social distance and impact desirability in TPE perceptions are 
illustrated in Figure 2. Although the relations are not linear in all cases, the different levels of 
differentials do not encourage speculations that certain combinations of message type and 
comparison group systematically stimulate perceptual gaps more than others. At least based on our 
data, the answer in the negative on RQ1 has to be preliminary and needs further elaboration from 
future empirical work. 
A set of three hypothesis specified the role of perceptual gaps for behavioural intentions of 
respondents. We tested the influence of all twelve difference values on the collective action and both 
individual action variable by means of linear regression analysis (see Table 2). The results are 
disappointing at least – the variance explained by the independent variables is small, and beta values 
are distributed unsystematically. Support for voting restrictions increases when people assume that 
personal discussions and TV debates have a higher impact on the general public on self, when they 
believe that political advertising influences their friends more strongly, but decreases when TV 
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debates are perceived to effect their close acquaintances. Efforts for decision-making on the other 
hand are intensified when debates with friends and interviews with politicians seem to influence self 
stronger than the general public, but at the same time when debates with friends are perceived to 
influence others more than self. Finally, political efficacy increases when people feel that political 
news and features have a high impact on them compared to the general public. But it is difficult to 
make sense of these singular relationships, adding another lack of evidence for the behavioural 
component of TPE to the existing research literature. 
 
[about here: Table 2] 
 
Voting experience was introduced in our study on political TPE effects as a specification of 
the usual age variable (H7). We expected larger perceptual gaps for experienced voters, and this is 
true for ten of the twelve differentials calculated in this study, five of them being statistically 
significant (see again Table 1). It seems as if first-time voters hold the opinion that they differ less 
from others in their vulnerability to media impact – an attitude which changes over the years. By 
and large, the first part of H7 is supported by our result; for the second part of H7 which addresses 
the behavioural component we found no support (data not shown). Just as for the sample as a whole, 
regressions in both groups of voters did not yield any substantial results. 
Our final research question asked whether media use patterns, indicators for political 
involvement, and general personal traits influence the magnitude of perceptual gaps. For an easier 
understanding we summed up the six differentials for political sources to a single index value for 
second-person perceptions (SPP) and third-person perceptions (TPP). Pearson correlations show that 
two constructs are related to both sorts of gaps: With increasing education, perceptual differences 
decrease (SPP: -.11; TPP: -.21) which is in contrast to earlier research but supports the only other 
TPE from Germany (Brosius & Engel, 1996). And a perceived media bias enhances SPP and TPP, 
as people believe media effects on others to increase when they see the media’s position apart from 
their own (SPP: .16; TPP: .17). Moreover, a positive image of media reduces a perceived media 
impact on the general public (TPP: -.11). Media use and political involvement variables display 
some significant correlations for single types of political communication sources, but as some are 
positive and some are negative, they level out in one index. Again, evidence is too weak for an in-
Second- and Third-Person-Effects of Political Communication in Germany - 18 - 
 
depth analysis, but we may record that personality strength, use of audiovisual media, and political 
interest are seemingly unrelated to SPP and TPP, while print media and Internet use, and particularly 
party affiliation and political knowledge are correlated with some of the differentials. 
 
Conclusions 
The aim of our study was to analyze second- and third-person effects of several political 
communication sources, including their consequences for behavioural intentions and with particular 
emphasis on the role of voting experience for people’s perceptions. Its main results can be 
summarized in the following: 
1. The perceptual component of the TPE concept was supported throughout. Representing the 
second TPE study (succeeding the Brosius & Engel work from the 1990s) and the first field study in 
Germany, the basic assumption of perceptual differences between media impact on self and others 
seems to be unaffected by the cultural background of both countries. Furthermore, the social 
distance hypothesis is confirmed for all types of media content, giving reason to the ‘impersonal 
impact’ background of the TPE concept. Nevertheless, we cannot rule out that what we 
operationalized as social distance is in fact the effect inferences of how likely the comparison groups 
are to be exposed to the media content in question (Eveland et al., 1999). 
2. We confirmed the important part the type of media message plays for the magnitude of 
perceptual gaps. While undesirable impact yields larger differentials, desirable impact in our case 
did not evoke reversed but substantially smaller differentials. However, our results should remind 
that any classification of messages as desirable or not might be misleading – other than expected, 
German voters saw TV debates of leading candidates as highly influential on others. 
3. On the other hand, evidence for the effect of perceptual gaps on behavioural intentions was 
limited. The mixed evidence encountered in earlier research led scholars to question the perceptual 
difference being an appropriate predictor variable for individual behaviour (Tewksbury et al., 2004). 
Instead, the presumed behaviour of others was seen as an obvious influence, but empirical proof for 
that relationship was also rather weak (Jensen & Hurley, 2005: 250). In our case, may be the 
collective action construct was operationalized inadequately for the field of political communication 
where supporting voting restrictions for certain groups of people might be not tolerable for an 
informed citizen. On the other hand, the individual action variables addressed behavioural intentions 
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that are obviously unrelated to TPE perceptions, which also supports the ‘impersonal impact’ 
background indirectly. 
4. When media impact on political assessments is concerned, personal characteristics (such as 
the individual voting experience) need to be taken into account. Effects perceptions depend on 
people’s life experiences rather than on coverage on effects in the media themselves. Other traits 
such as party affiliation or political knowledge influence respondent’s perceived vulnerability to 
media impact. 
Altogether, our study adds some evidence to the understanding of TPE mechanisms. Beyond 
the conclusion that the TPE framework may fruitfully be adopted for other societies than the U.S., it 
demonstrated the need for further research on the implications of TPE in the realm of political 
decision-making. People hold certain opinions on the way others seem to build their political 
attitude, but the relevance of these perceptions for public opinion is still unclear. 
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Appendix: Sample description by voting experience (percentages and mean values) 
 
 first time  
voters  
(≤ 21 y.)  
n = 167 
experienced 
voters 
(> 21 y.) 
n = 256 
sample 
total 
 
n = 423 
gender 
   female 
   male 
 
51 % 
49 % 
 
44 % 
56 % 
 
47 % 
53 % 
education 
   secondary school and less  
...high school 
   college degree 
   vocational training 
 
12 % 
84 % 
-- 
3 % 
 
26 % 
27 % 
14 % 
31 % 
 
21 % 
50 % 
9 % 
20 % 
former East German citizen 15 % 17 % 16 % 
political position 
left (0) – right (100), mean value  
 
41 (SD = 17) 
 
49 (SD = 18) 
 
45 (SD = 18) 
preferred candidate 
   Schröder (incumbent chancellor) 
   Stoiber (opposition leader) 
   none of them 
 
69 % 
16 % 
15 % 
 
55 % 
33 % 
12 % 
 
61 % 
26 % 
13 % 
voter turnout 88 % 97 % 93 % 
voting decision 
   CDU/CSU (concervative) 
...SPD (social democrats) 
   FDP (liberals) 
   Grüne (Green party) 
   PDS (former GDR Socialist Unity 
Party) 
...other 
(n = 133) 
17 % 
44 % 
9 % 
21 % 
5 % 
3 % 
(n = 182) 
32 % 
41 % 
8 % 
10 % 
4 % 
4 % 
(n = 315) 
26 % 
43 % 
9 % 
15 % 
4 % 
3 % 
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Figure 1: A model of second- and third-person effects in political communication 
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Table 1: Second- and third-person perception differentials for different types of political sources 
 
 second person perception third person perception 
 all 
respondents 
(n = 415) 
first-time 
voters 
(n = 166) 
experienced 
voters 
(n = 249) 
all 
respondents 
(n = 415) 
first-time 
voters 
(n = 166) 
experienced 
voters 
(n = 249) 
political news 
and features 
3,3 (28,3) - 0,3 (27,4) 5,8 (28,7) + 11,0 (29,9) *** 5,7 (25,9) 14,5 (32,0) ++ 
interviews with 
politicians 
3,9 (27,1) 3,1 (24,7) 4,4 (28,6) 7,7 (30,1) ** 5,2 (28,1) 9,4 (31,4) 
debates with 
friends 
7,0 (26,1) 2,9 (25,5) 9,8 (26,2) ++ 10,5 (27,5) ** 4,3 (24,9) 14,7 (10,5) +++ 
TV debates of 
candidates 
15,2 (29,5) 15,0 (30,1) 15,4 (29,11) 32,9 (30,2) *** 31,9 (31,9) 33,7 (29,1) 
polling results 10,2 (23,2) 12,1 (21,5) 8,9 (24,3) 22,6 (24,7) *** 22,7 (22,3) 22,5 (25,2) 
political 
advertising 
6,6 (21,7) 4,5 (19,3) 8,1 (23,3) 23,3 (23,7) *** 20,2 (23,3) 25,3 (23,8) + 
 
Mean values between -100 and +100; SD in brackets. 
All respondents: differences between second- and third-person effects: *** p < .001; ** p < .01; * p 
< .05. 
Voter group: differences between first time and experienced voters: +++ p < .001; ++ p < .01; + p < 
.05. 
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Figure 2: Interaction in perceptual gaps between social distance and message type (n = 415) 
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Table 2: Linear Regressions of second- and third-person perception differentials for different types 
of political sources on behavioural intentions 
 
 
 support for voting 
restrictions 
efforts for decision-
making 
political efficacy 
Second-person perceptions    
• political news and features    
• interviews with politicians    
• debates with friends  .33  
• TV debates of candidates -.21   
• polling results    
• political advertising .15   
Third-person perceptions    
• political news and features   -.17 
• interviews with politicians  -.17  
• debates with friends .21 -.32  
• TV debates of candidates .23   
• polling results    
• political advertising    
n 356 338 335 
R² .05 .05 .04 
F-value 1.51 (n.s.) 2.45 ** 2.08 * 
 
Entries are standardized beta values with p < .05 only. 
 
 
 
